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Abstract
Early retirement is predominantly considered to be the result of
incentives set by social security and the tax system. But the Swiss ex-
ample demonstrates that the incidence of early retirement has dramat-
ically increased even in the absence of institutional changes. We argue
that an actuarially fair, but mandatory funded system may also dis-
tort optimal individual allocation. If individuals are credit constraint
(or just reluctant to borrow), a higher than desired retirement capital
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1induces people to retire earlier than they would have in the absence
of such a scheme. Individuals thus retire as soon as the retirement
income is deemed suﬃcient and the pension plan avails withdrawal of
beneﬁts.
We provide evidence using individual data from a selection of Swiss
pension funds, allowing us to perfectly control for pension scheme de-
tails. Our ﬁndings suggest that aﬀordability is indeed a key determi-
nant in the retirement decisions. The fact that early retirement has
become much more prevalent in the last 15 years is a strong indicator
for the importance of aﬀordability as the maturing the Swiss manda-
tory funded pension system over that period has led to an increase
in the already high eﬀective replacement rates. Moreover, even after
controlling for the time trend, the higher the accumulated pension
capital, the earlier men, and — to a smaller extent — women, tend
to leave the work force.
Jel–Classiﬁcation: D91, H55
Keywords: Occupational Pension, Retirement Decision, Duration Models
21 Introduction
The increase in early retirement is a widespread phenomenon throughout
Europe causing ﬁnancial distress to almost all public pension systems. In
most countries the main reason for this eﬀect seems clear: High replacement
ratios and high implicit tax rates on working beyond a certain age induce
workers to opt for an early exit out of the labor market. But early retirement
is also prevalent — albeit to a lesser degree — in Switzerland, where implicit
tax rates on working on in old age are virtually zero within the ﬁrst pillar and
zero to low in most second pillar schemes. Like in many other countries, the
retirement age has fallen in the last decade despite the fact that institutional
incentives (statutory retirement age, pension accrual rates, replacement rates
and other factors) have stayed basically unchanged.
We argue that high pension replacement rates may trigger early retire-
ment also in the absence of an implicit tax on working towards the end of
individuals’ working life. At ﬁrst sight, this is not surprising. Time series evi-
dence in OECD countries show that workers are more likely to withdraw from
the labor market as soon as they have reached pensionable age if beneﬁts are
close to wages. However, the previous evidence may also be a consequence
of replacement rates being much higher for low income individuals. Our
data reveals that high replacement rates may have an equally strong or even
stronger eﬀect for high income workers. As a consequence the current policy
of strengthening of the second pillar in old age insurance and thus the link
between lifetime earnings and future pensions may lead to a decrease in the
incidence of early retirement for low income individuals, but to an increase
in early retirement among higher income earners, unless there is a cap on the
level of income insured by the scheme.
Economic theory predicts that workers choose their intertemporal con-
sumption and labor supply optimally according to a utility function and
with respect to a lifetime budget constraint. If the adjustment for early
retirement were the same for everybody and in the absence of (capital mar-
ket) distortions, richer individuals should retire later due to their higher life
expectancy (and a potentially lower disutility of labor). To get a more re-
alistic picture of individuals’ decisions at retirement, one has to take into
account potential departures from rationality and perfect markets. A ﬁrst is
myopia of individuals. If individuals are forced to save for their retirement
they may achieve a higher utility than without a pension system. But the
3replacement level could still be too low to reach a suﬃcient (subsistence)
income level in old age, especially for low income workers. In that case,
poorer individuals might be forced to work longer. A second distortion could
be credit constraints or merely the reluctance of individuals to accumulate
debt. A high replacement rate would then lead to an overaccumulation of
capital compared to the desired level of pension assets. To oﬀset this eﬀect,
people would retire earlier than desired. In both cases aﬀordability plays a
key role. We will argue in the paper that within the Swiss pension system,
wealthier individuals are more likely to aﬀord an exit from the labor market
at a relatively low age.
To support this claim, we focus on the role of accumulated pension wealth
on the retirement decision. We use a unique dataset of individual retirement
decisions provided by a number of privately run (but publicly mandated)
pension funds. This allows us to control for all company speciﬁc pension
plan details. Due to the fact that the second pillar has been mandatory in
Switzerland since 1985 (and had been oﬀered by a majority of companies even
before that year), diﬀerences in accumulated capital at retirement within the
same cohort closely mirror diﬀerences in lifetime income. Moreover, due to
the maturing of the second pillar the average pension capital, und thus the
eﬀective replacement rate has been steadily increasing over the years and
now reaches high replacement rates for all income groups. Unlike in other
countries, the structure of the scheme leads to replacement rates that are
similar for lower to upper middle class incomes.
We ﬁnd that the incidence of early retirement has increased considerably
over the last decade despite the fact that there were no institutional changes
throughout that period. Due to an increase in the eﬀective replacement rate
within Switzerland’s second pillar, more people are now able to accumulate
suﬃcient funds to pay for an early labor market exit than one or two decades
ago. But even if we control for this apparent time trend, wealthier men tend
to leave the work force earlier. Low income workers, on the other hand,
often work up to the legal retirement age even in pension funds in which
early retirement packages are generous. In these cases the need to generate
income seems to be the only explanation for working up to the statutory
retirement year. Due to diﬀerences in mortality rates across income groups,
richer individuals thus tend to enjoy a much longer retirement spell than
poorer people. For the pension funds, this means that adverse selection
eﬀects are unimportant.
4Our empirical analysis delivers other interesting ﬁndings. Despite data
limitations, we ﬁnd that marital status is another key determinant for retire-
ment decisions. Married women tend to retire earlier than both singles and
widows, whereas single men tend to have a higher exit rate than non-singles.
These ﬁndings suggest that the retirement decisions of husband and wife are
interdependent. Financial needs and joint retirement problems seem to be
the dominating forces.
Our analysis suggests that the reason for early retirement does not solely
lie in the incentive structure implied by public pension plans. In the pres-
ence of suﬃcient funds the preference for leisure in old age seems to be a
dominating driving force for leaving employment. Many poorer individuals
only keep working because they cannot aﬀord to retire.
2 Background
2.1 The Swiss social security system
Switzerland’s pension system is composed of three pillars, of which the ﬁrst
and second are of approximately equal importance.1 The ﬁrst pillar is a
predominantly pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system and aims at providing a basic
subsistence level of income to all retired residents in Switzerland. The second
pillar is a mandatory, employer-based, fully funded occupational pension
scheme.2 Gross replacement ratios in Switzerland increased from 28.4% in
1961 to 49.3 % in 1995. For workers with an uninterupted working carreer
who are covered by a second pillar scheme, the gross replacement rate is
much higher, as Table 2 demonstrates. The statutory retirement age is 65
for men and currently 64 for women (has been 62 until 2002), the latter will
be increased gradually to 65 in the next few years.3
In 2000, on average, approximately 50% and 40% of publicly provided
retirement income were paid out by the ﬁrst and second pillar, respectively.
1A detailed description of all aspects of the Swiss social security system is, however,
beyond the scope of this paper. The interested reader is referred to Queissar & Vittas
(2000, especially concerning institutional details) and B¨ utler (2004, for the second pillar).
2The third pillar are earmarked and tax-favored private savings, but only few people
use this opportunity.
3Note that retirement at 65/64 is not mandatory by law, but reaching age 65 for men
or age 64 for women is rather an eligibility condition for claiming public pension beneﬁts.
Most labor contracts specify a retirement age that coincides with the eligibility age.
5The second pillar’s main goal is to maintain the pre-retirement living stan-
dard together with the beneﬁts stemming from the ﬁrst pillar. Upon attain-
ment of retirement age, the accumulated capital can be withdrawn either as
a monthly life-long annuity or as a lump sum (or a mix of the two) provided
the pension fund allows for the lump sum option.
The second pillar is designed to be integrated with the ﬁrst pillar. As the
latter provides a basic level of income, the second pillar only insures income
above a certain threshold level, which is equal to a yearly maximum single
ﬁrst pillar pension4. This lower threshold explains the much lower coverage
for female workers, who often work part–time and have lower average wages
than men. While there is in principle also a maximum insured income, most
companies do not implement it.
The minimum contribution rates increase considerably with age (from 7%
at age 25 to 18% from age 55 onwards) and the employer has to pay at least
half. They are mandated by law, but the details are left to the individual
pension providers. The contributions are accumulated as retirement assets
and bear an interest rate. The minimum rate of return, which is determined
by the Swiss Federal Council, remained at 4% for 17 years (from 1985 to
the end of 2002), despite the fact that market returns showed considerable
variability and exceeded this 4% level by a large margin most of the time.
The accrued capital is fully portable when the insured individual changes
the employer.5 The total amount at retirement has been accumulated over
the entire work life and is, therefore, a good proxy for lifetime income. Old
age pension beneﬁts are strictly proportional to the accumulated retirement
assets (plus accrued interest). The accumulated capital is translated into
a yearly pension using a ﬁxed conversion factor, which had been constant
at 7.2% from 1985 to 2004. From 2005 it will be reduced in line with the
increased life expectancy.6
The second pillar mandates joint annuities. Children under age 18 (or
4In 2004, this threshold was: 25’320 CHF ≈ 17’000 EURO ≈ 18’500 USD.
5By law, an employee changing the ﬁrm gets the accumulated total contributions ac-
crued at the minimum interest rate. The total sum has to be paid into the new fund,
with very few exceptions (self–employment under certain conditions, those who leave the
country for good).
6The conversion factor does not vary with gender, family status or income. The 7.2%
were constructed using a discount rate of 4% (the legal minimum requirement for 17 years)
and somewhat optimistic — from the pension provider’s perspective — mortality tables.
This conversion factor delivers money’s worth ratios clearly above 1 (see Table 1).
6under age 25 if still dependent) of retired persons get an additional pension
of 20% of the main claimant’s beneﬁt. When a retired man dies, his widow
receives a beneﬁt amounting to 60% of the previous pension, his dependent
children a beneﬁt of up to 20% each. As obvious from Table 1 this leads to
sizeable diﬀerences in the money’s worth ratios.
Most pension funds aim at a replacement rate of approximately 50% to
60% of the insured income. Together with the income from the ﬁrst pillar
and the fact that there are no social security deductions on pension beneﬁts,
the net replacement rate before taxes amounts to at least 70-80% even for
high income groups. Due to the fact that federal and cantonal taxes in
Switzerland are progressive, and due to the availability of additional children
pension beneﬁts, the eﬀective net replacement rate can be well above 100%
as Table 2 illustrates.
Early retirement options are now oﬀered by most companies. For many
this is simply an actuarially fair reduction of the conversion factor in the case
of early withdrawals. For others more generous early retirement packages
exist, including additional payments to make up for ﬁrst pillar beneﬁts up
to the legal retirement age. Take up rates for early second pillar beneﬁts
are very high. On average, the observed retirement in occupational plans
is substantially below the statutory age even in funds that do not subsidize
early retirement explicitly.7
insert Tables 1 & 2 here
2.2 Related literature
A large part of the previous research has been devoted to analyze the role
of the social security system in explaining the retirement decision of older
workers. Kotlikoﬀ (1979) shows that the provision of social security will
not aﬀect the retirement decision under the assumption of perfect capital
markets, actuarial fairness and known lifespan, as pensions are equivalent to
private savings. Crawford and Lilien (1981) relax each assumption in turn,
and show that the eﬀect on the date of retirement is in general ambiguous,
7The ﬁrst pillar did not avail early retirement schemes until very recently. Since then
the take-up rates of these early beneﬁts have been small. Presumably this is due to the
fact, that many second pillar pension plans allow an anticipation of beneﬁts at actuarially
fair rates (or better). This latter option is administratively more convenient for most
beneﬁciaries.
7but that a progressive system tends to advance retirement for low-income
workers. Social security also has an impact upon the labor supply decision
and on the allocation of labor and consumption over the life cycle. Craig
and Batina (1991) simulate the strengths of such eﬀects. Their results show
how the introduction of a social security program acts as a disincentive to
supply labor in the later stages of life, thus aﬀecting also the level of output
produced and the capital-labor ratio.
The quantitative eﬀect of old age insurance on retirement has been mea-
sured using alternative approaches, like the “lifetime budget constraint” ap-
proach (Burtless and Hausman, 1978; Hausman and Wise, 1980; Burtless,
1986), the “option value” approach (Lazear and Moore, 1988; Stock and
Wise, 1990), the “hazard model” approach (Diamond and Hausman, 1984;
Hausman and Wise, 1985), or, more recently, the “structural dynamic pro-
gramming” approach (Rust, 1995; Stern, 1997; Bingley and Lanot, 2004).
Hazard model approaches in which the retirement decision is treated as a
dynamic discrete choice have been used in Miniaci (1998) for Italy, Antolin &
Scarpetta (1998) for Germany, Mastrogiacomo, Alessie & Lindeboom (2002)
for the Netherlands, Maestas (2004) for US.
A diﬀerent perspective in understanding the retirement decision of older
workers has been developed along a more behavioral context: timing of with-
drawal from the labor force may be inﬂuenced by other factors, like one’s own
health, the desire to pursue diﬀerent activities, or, if married, a partner’s
work status. Poor health is consistently mentioned in the literature as a rea-
son for retirement, particularly before recent trends toward early retirement
resulting from corporate and pension/social security incentives (Howe and
Manning 1987; Monette, 1996). Overall, poor health is associated to lower
satisfaction in retirement (Encel and Studencki, 1996; Sharpley, Gordon and
Jacobs, 1996). Retirement may also be aﬀected by the willingness to increase
social participation in later life, by having contact with friends and family
which promote physical and psychological health (Teshuva, Stanislavsky and
Kendig 1994). Moreover, the decision to retire may be jointly taken within
a household, so that husbands and wives tend to retire at the same time,
irrespective of their age. A number of studies for several countries (Gustman
and Steinmeier, 1994; Blau, 1998; Jimenez-Martin et al., 1999; An et al., 2004
among others) ﬁnd empirical evidence of the importance of coordination of
retirement dates, and provide similarity of tastes, complementarity of leisure,
sharing of household ﬁnances, health factors, correlation of unobserved tastes
8as possible explanations. Huang (1988) and Hurd (1990) report that both
partners retire within the same month in 6-8 percent of their sample, within
one year in 24-28 percent. Zweim¨ uller et al. (1996) ﬁnd a high and positive
correlation of unobservable factors in the retirement process of both spouses.
The increasing relevance of this phenomenon leads to the conclusion that
aggregate eﬀects of retirement or pension policy change should be assessed
on the basis of joint retirement models. A number of studies (Encel and Stu-
dencki, 1996; Monette, 1996; Maestas, 2004) point out that for some people
retirement may not mean total withdrawal from all paid employment, but
only retirement from a speciﬁc work career. This turns out to be particularly
true for those with higher education and professional or managerial skills.
There are relatively few contributions that explicitly model the exit from
the labor market as a function of lifetime income. Using various sources of
evidence, Costa (1998) argues that the decrease in the average retirement
age in the US during the last century can be attributed to a great extent
to a wealth/income eﬀect. Bloom, Canning and Moore (2004) present a
theoretical life-cycle approach in which a higher life-time income reduces the
retirement age ceteris paribus, while better health and a longer life-span lead
to a longer work period, albeit in a less than proportional way. What seems
to emerge from a number of empirical country studies, to be found in Gruber
and Wise (2004), is that a higher (life-time) income raises the retirement age
(probably by a lower disutility of work), while higher pension beneﬁts reduces
it. Which of the two eﬀects dominates when the retirement income is very
strongly related to lifetime income, as in the Swiss case, is not clear, however.
2.3 Retirement and Life-time Income
According to economic theory workers should choose their intertemporal con-
sumption and labor supply so as to maximize an intertemporal utility func-
tion with respect to a lifetime budget constraint. If the adjustment for early
retirement were the same for everybody and in the absence of (capital mar-
ket) distortions, richer individuals should then retire later due to their higher
life expectancy (and a potentially lower disutility of labor).
But people are neither fully rational, nor are markets complete. One of
the rationales for introducing social security in the ﬁrst place was the fear
that people might not be able to accumulate suﬃcient funds for retirement.
Forcing individuals to contribute to a pension scheme (in the form of taxes
9or earmarked savings) reduces this ineﬃciency and might lead to an ex post
more eﬃcient allocation of lifetime resources. Typically replacement rates of
social security systems decrease with pre-retirement income to account for
the fact that the level of retirement income deemed suﬃcient to cover the
needs in old age increases less than proportionally with income (or may even
be constant).
Assuming that targeted pension income increases less than proportion-
ately with pre-retirement income, we expect the following: Richer individu-
als should save more for retirement, or — if they are partly myopic — work
longer when the link between pre-retirement income and pension beneﬁts
is ﬂat. On the other hand, when pension beneﬁts are approximately pro-
portional to pre-retirement income, it takes longer for the poor to reach a
suﬃcient level of pension income leading to a higher retirement age. In the
Swiss case, with net replacement rates nearly constant for low to medium
income levels, we can thus expect a decrease in the eﬀective retirement age
with accumulated pension capital.
Now let us consider the impact of credit market restrictions: If people
are constraint, or simply reluctant to borrow, a high replacement rate would
lead to an over-accumulation of capital compared to the desired level of
pension assets. To oﬀset this eﬀect, people could retire earlier than desired.
If this eﬀect was strong enough, people would want to retire at the earliest
possible age, at which a withdrawal of beneﬁts is possible.8 It is not a
priori clear, what would be the impact of life time income in this context.
Again, if the minimum level of retirement beneﬁts increases in a less than
proportional way with pre-retirement income, people with higher income
reach the target at a lower replacement rate, i.e., at an earlier age. Typically,
individuals with higher lifetime income also have a steeper income proﬁle.
Thus the ﬁnal replacement rate may underestimate the more relevant average
replacement rate. Comparing individuals with similar ﬁnal replacement rates
(as is the case in the relevant income range), higher incomes can aﬀord an
earlier exit from the labor market even if the targeted level of pension income
is proportional to life-time income. Note, however, that these people are also
very unlikely to be credit constraint. This latter eﬀect is only relevant if
people are reluctant to borrow out of non-pension wealth.
But how likely is over-saving within the second pillar in Switzerland?
8The fact that a majority of elderly workers retire as soon as beneﬁts are available is
still somewhat of a puzzle. See Gruber and Wise (2004) for more discussion and evidence.
10Pretty likely, if one considers the large ﬁnal net replacement rates even for
very high income levels. Taking into account that expenditure needs may
fall after retirement due to an increase in home production (as reported by
Rohwedder and Hurd (2003)), pension beneﬁts are very likely to be higher
than the desired level.9 Thus, a distortion of optimal individual allocations
induced by the scheme at younger ages may lead to a socially suboptimal
low retirement age. With both myopic individuals and borrowing constraints,
aﬀordability is likely to play a key role.
3 Data and empirical strategy
This section is devoted to the description of the database and the imple-
mented empirical analysis.
3.1 The data
In the empirical analysis we use data collected at the individual level from
15 Swiss companies, both public and private, active in several industrial
branches. They include the national public railway company, civil servants
in two cantons, several industry ﬁrms, as well as clothing and food ﬁrms.
We use only observations with retirement year 1990 and later, due to lack of
suﬃcient information for earlier years.
The dataset consists of 8452 observations10. We have information about
date (or year) of birth, marital status, date (or year) of retirement, yearly
pension payments (base level) and yearly additional pensions for children and
for ﬁrst pillar replacement packages. On the ﬁrm level, we are also provided
with details of early retirement plans, in particular the adjustment in the
conversion factor and the availability of ﬁrst pillar replacement packages.
9Hurd and Rohwedder (2003) point out that the empirically observed drop in spend-
ing at retirement may theoretically be well within the spirit of the life cycle model and
fully consistent with forward-looking behavior. Their empirical estimates suggest that the
decline in consumption is mainly due to substitution of market-expenses for goods and
services by home production.
10The cleaning and editing of the data has been a considerable task. Firstly, the data
format provided varied widely across companies. Secondly, much of the relevant informa-
tion for the project had to be imputed from other sources (regulation of pension fund)
or from a combination of available data. In many cases the information could only be
gathered from a personal interview with the responsible pension fund manager.
11Some ﬁrms also provide us with information about the number of chil-
dren under 18/2511, the amount withdrawn as a lump sum (if this option
is available), the total capital accumulated at retirement, and an indicator
whether the individual has chosen a non-standard retirement option.
As reported in Table 3, males and females represent 63.5 and 36.5 percent
of the sample, respectively. The distribution of marital status is very diﬀer-
ent for men and women, the great majority of men is married (85.4%) at
retirement, whereas almost half of the retiring women live alone (52.6% only
are married). There are also large diﬀerences in annuity across gender and
marital status, with women getting approximately half the amount of men
on average. The only exception are singles, for which females fare better.
This can be explained by the fact that single women are more likely to be
well educated than average women, whereas the contrary is the case for men.
The sample consists of individuals whose age at retirement ranges from 55
to 70. We explicitly exclude all observations for which the path to retirement
passes through a period of disability beneﬁts. Despite a diﬀerence of 3 years
between men and women in the statutory retirement age for individuals in
the sample, the diﬀerence in the factual retirement age is less than half of
this number. The median or average retirement age does not seem to vary
very much across marital status either. There have been, however, important
changes in retirement behavior over the last 15 years. Figure 1 depicts the
distributions of the age at retirement for men and women for three diﬀerent
subperiods (1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2003).
The distribution of age at retirement has a peak at the respective (current)
statutory/eligibility retirement age of 65 (men) and 62 (women).12 For the
second time period the proﬁle for men has another peak around age 62, which
is the age at which some pension funds oﬀer early retirement beneﬁts —
sometimes even full — even for men. This peak becomes the most prominent
one in the third period. We also notice another peak at age 60. This is often
the lowest age for which early retirement packages are oﬀered at relatively
good conditions. It is interesting to note that a sizeable fraction of women
work beyond the statutory retirement age, though this number has clearly
decreased over time. The most striking feature of these distributions is a
clear shift of the retirement decision to lower ages for both men and women.
11Children under age 18 are always eligible for additional beneﬁts. For those over 18,
but under 25, a pension is available for disabled children and those still in school.
12For all women in the sample, 62 was the relevant eligibility age for ﬁrst pillar beneﬁts.
12This decrease is particularly strong from 1995-1999 to 2000-2003.13
It is important to mention that the fraction of people retiring early within
the included pension plans far exceeds the corresponding fraction for the
whole population. For the companies in our dataset 79% of men and 62% of
women retire before the statutory retirement age in 2002-2003, whereas the
corresponding numbers for the whole of Switzerland are 55% (men) and 44%
(women) in 2002.14
insert Figure 1 & Table 3 here
3.2 The empirical strategy
We use the hazard model (or survival) approach for our empirical analysis.
Survival-time data documents spans of time (duration) ending in an event,
called “failure”. As the purpose of the paper is to understand the timing
of retirement and retirement transitions, in particular, the failure event in
our case is entering retirement. The retirement hazard rate in t gives the
hazard of retiring in t conditional on being in the labor force and not having
retired yet until t. Similarly, the survival function gives the probability of
continuing working in t. Note that the time axis t of the model corresponds
to “age at retirement” and not to the calendar time axis. We will ﬁrst use the
survival function for a non-parametric analysis of the probability to retire for
our data set as a whole and for diﬀerent subsets of the data. We then turn
to the analysis of the inﬂuence of covariates using the semi-parametric Cox
proportional hazard model. For the latter we constructed a set of variables
which is described in detail below.
As is obvious from Figure 1, retirement behavior is very diﬀerent for
men and women. For individuals retiring before 2004, the eligibility age for
old age beneﬁts as well as many conditions within company pension plans
(notably early retirement conditions) are also very diﬀerent across gender.
We thus analyze men and women separately. Moreover, women are more
likely than men to experience discontinuous work histories, be inﬂuenced by
13The median (mean) retirement age for men is 65 (63.2), 63 (62.7), and 62 (61.7) for the
periods 1990-1994, 1995-1999, and 2000-2003, respectively. The corresponding numbers
for women are 62 (61.5), 62 (61.3), and 60.1 (60.2), respectively.
14Recall that, in general, low income people (and to some extent self-employed) are not
covered by second pillar pension plans. This might be a ﬁrst indicator that individuals
who retire early do so because they can aﬀord it.
13family responsibilities and family life cycle stages across the life span, be
exposed to social roles beyond the work force, encounter ﬁnancial instability,
and live in retirement for a longer period of time.
An important task is to construct our proxy for the lifetime income,
namely a measure of second pillar income that is equivalent across compa-
nies. This is basically equivalent to constructing a measure for accumulated
capital at retirement plus adding the present value of additional beneﬁts to
be received by the pensioners. For this purpose, we use ﬁrm speciﬁc informa-
tion on conversion factors, early retirement plans and other beneﬁts.15 The
variable “annuity” corresponds to the yearly pension at the regular retirement
age if all capital were fully annuitized, including the regular yearly pension
plus any temporary payments, as well as the annuitized value of any lump
sum payment upon retirement. To account for economic growth and inﬂa-
tion, these numbers are deﬂated by the nominal Swiss GDP (indexed, base
year 2000). For our empirical analysis we use the log (variable “ln(annuity)”)
as well as its square (variable “ln(annuity)2”) to capture potential nonlinear
eﬀects. Recall that, due to the legal requirement to transfer pension capital
from a previous to the current employer, second pillar capital or income is a
very good proxy for lifetime income. Nonetheless, individual data on retire-
ment wealth cannot convey an exact picture of a person’s wealth position as
the latter depends on additional income and wealth by the spouse, especially
for women.
The variable “ln(annuity)” has an additional feature we might need to
take into account: it increases during the relevant period. If we observe an
individual from the age 55 on up to her age at retirement of, for example 64,
then her retirement income increased during this period due to contributions
and interests. We want to account for this fact by treating the two annuity
variables as time-varying variables and interact them with a linear increasing
function of the time axis of the model. Another justiﬁcation for this step is
that our test of the proportional hazard assumption turns out to be slightly
15To compute the increase in the retirement capital between the observed retirement
age and the statutory retirement age, we need a measure of the relevant wage for that
period. As we do not always know the wage prior to the (early) retirement decision, we
had to impute it from the accumulated capital, using information on company speciﬁc
contribution rates, the average wage growth and (if available) other beneﬁts. We have
experimented with diﬀerent versions of imputation, but the results turned out to be very
robust.
14violated for this variable.16 The time variation is one way to correct for this
violation. However, in order to prove the robustness of our results, we report
results with and without time trend.
Time is bound to play another important role despite the fact that the
proxy for average life-time income has been deﬂated. The eﬀective replace-
ment rate has increased due to a maturation of the system in most companies.
This eﬀect is captured by dummies for the retirement year. Alternatively,
we have also worked with a linear retirement year trend, but, as the results
are basically identical, we do not report the outcomes.
Diﬀerential behavior between cohorts might play a role in our analysis.
In A set of dummy variables captures the marital status of the individuals
in our data set. We include dummies for “married”, “widowed” and “di-
vorced/separated” which we compare to the base “singles”.17
order to investigate this issue, we have included cohort dummies and
experimented with a whole variety of diﬀerent cohort deﬁnitions, including
3 or 4 birth years per cohort or following features of our data set as well
as historical events. Including cohort dummies implies excluding retirement
year dummies due to the high correlation between these. However, the co-
hort dummies are always highly signiﬁcant regardless of the speciﬁcation.
We conclude that we cannot assign a change in the behavior to any cohort
speciﬁcity. The results of the estimations with cohort dummies are very
close to those with retirement year dummies, which implies that the latter
already capture possible changes in the behavior. However, we report the
16The Cox proportional hazard model does not assume a speciﬁc probability distribution
for the time until an event occurs. It assumes that the hazard functions of any two
individuals are proportional over time, even if the values of one or more covariates are
diﬀerent. For example, if the hazard function of a married person is twice as high as the
hazard function of a non-married person, this should be the case for all possible ages at
retirement. We use a graphical test of the proportional hazard assumption (log-log plots).
17The test of the proportional hazard assumption turned out to not be violated for these
variables, except at the statutory retirement age of 62 for women and 65 for men (this was
also the case for the variables “ln(annuity)” and “ln(annuity)2”). As already mentioned,
this eﬀect is not surprising given the fact that contractual agreements often force people
to retire at this age. Even if one considers retirement ages around the eligibility age as
censored, the proportional hazard estimation is still often violated for data beyond the
statutory retirement age. We believe, however, that these observations should still be
included as they convey important information about retirement behavior. Estimations
carried out with a truncated data set do barely diﬀer from the complete data set.
15results of the estimations with cohort dummies for the basic regressions18.
(If cohort dummies are not reported, it means that they led to similar results
when included.) We have also run estimations by cohort without having any
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the results.
As pension plans diﬀer considerably across pension funds and in order
to also capture changes of company pension plans that may have inﬂuenced
people’s decision to retire or not, we always include company ﬁxed eﬀects.
For the largest companies in the sample, estimations are reported on the ﬁrm
level as well.
It is very intuitive to think that macroeconomic variables have an eﬀect on
the retirement decision.19 In order to account for this possible eﬀect, we ﬁrst
included information about GDP growth and unemployment (using diﬀerent
alternative speciﬁcations, such as total unemployment rate, unemployment
rate by gender, unemployment rate only for persons older than 55, as well as
their lagged values.). We were, however, not able to identify a clear eﬀect of
these variables, especially because of ambiguous interaction eﬀects between
the macroeconomic variables and the dummy variables for retirement year or
cohorts. Moreover, the ﬁt of the model did not get any better by including
macroeconomic variables and all other results remained entirely unaﬀected
by them. We, therefore, do not report them in our ﬁnal regressions.
At ﬁrst sight, all retirement ages are observable, i.e., there is no obvious
censoring in the data. However, although not required by law, many compa-
nies force people to retire by contractual agreements at the age eligible for
ﬁrst pillar beneﬁts at the latest. A late or early retirement presumably is
the result of the interaction of several reasons and options, whereas a retire-
ment at the statutory age is rather an automatic act without further careful
considerations. This means that we observe the eligibility age in such cases,
although the person might have chosen to work longer had she been free to
do so. A visual inspection of the histograms in Figure 1, with obvious peaks
at 65 (men) and 62 (women) seems to support the incidence of an important
18The reported cohort dummies follow historical events and hence are the same for the
analysis of men and women. More precisely, the dummies mark the birth years: < 1933
(years of great depression), 1933-1938 (pre world war II period), 1939-1945 (world war II),
> 1945 (post world war II period).
19During the time we analyze, the total unemployment rate signiﬁcantly rose from 0.5%
in 1990 to 5.2% in 1997 , then subsequently fell to 1.7% until 2001, and rose again af-
terwards. GDP growth increased from -0.8% in 1990 to 3.6% in 2001, and fell again
afterwards.
16bias at ages 65 and 62 for men and women, respectively. As a consequence,
we choose to mark all observations with retirement ages around the eligi-
bility age as censored, i.e., we treat them as if we did not know the reason
why these individuals had retired at that age. We have experimented with
various intervals around the eligibility age, ﬁnding very small diﬀerences in
estimation outcomes. Results are reported for a censoring interval of “eligi-
bility age ± 3 months”. As a robustness check, we also present estimations
with all data points marked uncensored.
To classify the diﬀerent estimations with respect to censoring and the
impact of the retirement year, the following notation has been chosen:
I = no time trend, no censoring
II = with time trend, no censoring
III = no time trend, with censoring
IV = with time trend, with censoring
In parenthesis, we add the gender (m = men, f = women), as well as the
number of the company or the retirement year if applicable.
4 Empirical results
The following sections report the results of the empirical duration analysis
carried out with the described Swiss data set. Firstly, we present a non-
parametric analysis using diﬀerent subsets of the data in order to demonstrate
the impact of several factors on the retirement decision. We then present the
semi-parametric estimation results.
4.1 Non-parametric estimation results
We have computed Kaplan-Meier survival function estimates for diﬀerent
subsets of the data (always by gender). The empirical survival functions —
only reported without censoring20 — are shown in Figures 2-4. Kaplan-Meier
survival estimates show the probability of not retiring up to a certain age.
20The results do not diﬀer very much if censoring is taken into account. The only
diﬀerence is around the eligibility age of 62 and 65 years for women and men, respectively.
As these observations are considered as censored, we do not observe a downward jump in
the survival probability at this point, but rather at the end of the censoring interval.
17Figure 2 depicts the corresponding estimates for the three time periods
1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2003. In line with Figure 1, we observe a clear
downward shift in the survival function for both women and men. The huge
downward jumps at 62 for women and 65 for men, respectively, are replaced
by many smaller jumps over all concerned ages. This reconﬁrms the obser-
vation of a more ﬂexible entry into retirement. Another striking observation
is that retirement ages are not equally spaced, but are rather concentrated
at full years. This is not surprising given the fact that adjustment rates for
early retirement are usually not adjusted in a continuous fashion, but rather
in discrete intervals of one year.
To explore the impact of marital status we have split the data along that
dimension. Figure 3 shows the results for individuals retiring between 2000
and 2003.21 For both women and men, the probability of still working after
age 55 is lowest for single individuals. Note, however, that single females
are also the “richest” women in the sample, while single men have the low-
est average annuity of all male retirees. So interpreting the ﬁgures without
disentangling the eﬀects of marital status and income is delicate. Married
men tend to stay in the labor force longer, while married women show an
exit pattern similar to single women. Divorced or separated women as well
as widows tend to work longer.
Figure 4 shows the estimated survival function by retirement income quar-
tile, again for the period 2000 to 2003. For both men and women, the lowest
retirement income quartile tends to stay longest in the work force, at least
until the statutory retirement age.22 The retirement behavior as a function
of income is monotonic for women, but clearly not for men.23 Men in the
middle income range tend to retire earlier than both richer and poorer men.
It seems as if income played a larger role for the retirement decision of women
than for men. However, retirement income is also very much correlated with
the family status for women, but far less for men. It is thus important to
control for marital status to assess the impact of income.
21Estimates of other periods look similar (not reported here). It is important to do the
analysis by period as diﬀerent aspects, notably changes in the distribution of the marital
status over time, may interact and inﬂuence the results.
22It is worth mentioning again, that second pillar retirement income is roughly propor-
tional to lifetime income above a certain income level in Switzerland. The term “income”
thus stands for both retirement income and average lifetime labor income.
23We therefore also include the square of “ln(annuity)” in all preliminary regressions,
but only report it if its inclusion leads to a better ﬁt of the model.
18insert Figures 2, 3 & 4 here
4.2 Cox proportional hazard estimation results
Tables 4 to 13 summarize the estimation results for various speciﬁcations for
women and men. The results are displayed as hazard ratios. A hazard ratio
greater than 1 means that a marginal increase in the covariate increases the
hazard to retire. If it is smaller than 1, a marginal increase in the covariate
decreases the hazard to retire.24 Estimated coeﬃcients for retirement dum-
mies are not reported in the tables, but are summarized in Figure 5. The
number of stars (*) for retirement year and cohort dummies in the tables
indicate the level of signiﬁcance for a majority of the estimated hazard coef-
ﬁcients: 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of signiﬁcance for a majority of coeﬃcients
are marked with (*), (**), and (***), respectively.
4.2.1 Results for women
Tables 4 to 8 present the results for women. Table 4 includes retirement year
dummies, Table 5 cohort dummies. In Table 6 the variable “ln(annuity)”
is replaced by dummy variables for the diﬀerent quartiles of “ln(annuity)”
(where quartile 1 denotes the lowest quartile). To assess the sensitivity of
our results, we have also conducted regressions with various subsets of the
data. Tables 7 reports some of these results on the ﬁrm level for the compa-
nies for which we had enough observations to carry out isolated estimations.
Table 8 displays the coeﬃcients for the three years with the highest number
of observations in the dataset. The estimation results of the sensitivity tests
do not diﬀer greatly from the overall regressions. Due to the much smaller
number of observations the signiﬁcance levels are lower.
Including a time trend for the “ln(annuity)” and/or censoring alters the
results only in a quantitative way. The time trend decreases the hazard
ratio of the “ln(annuity)” variables (which is obvious, as capturing the trend
should lower the net eﬀect), but barely changes the hazard ratio of the other
variables. Censoring the observations however increases the hazard ratio for
“ln(annuity)”, as uncensored estimations ignore the fact that poorer women
24In case of dummy variable the results have an even more precise interpretation: If the
hazard ratio is bigger than 1, a unit increase in the covariate increases the hazard rate by
(hazard ratio - 1) × 100% . If it is smaller than 1, a unit increase cuts the hazard rate to
(1 - hazard ratio) × 100%.
19might have wanted to work longer, but were not allowed to do so. On the
other hand, censoring slightly decreases the hazard ratios for the marital
status variables. Which model we use for our estimations seems not to make
a qualitative diﬀerence in the end. However, as we cannot rank the diﬀerent
models and identify the “best”, we keep and report all results.
The overall results for women are the following:
Retirement year
The retirement year dummies are highly signiﬁcant in all regressions. Also
if included in a linear fashion (not included in the tables), retirement year is
signiﬁcant at 1% level in all regressions. This means that early retirement
has become more prevalent over the last decade, which is also conﬁrmed by
the estimated coeﬃcients on retirement year dummies in Figure 5. Earlier
retirement may have been caused by an improved ﬂexibility in occupational
pension plans or the maturing of the system (enabling more women to with-
draw earlier from the labor force). The cohort dummies, which are also
highly signiﬁcant (Table 5), capture a similar eﬀect.
Marital status
The results for marital status are the following. Married women tend to
have a higher exit rate than both singles and widows. This result may be
explained by two factors. The ﬁrst is a joint retirement decision of married
couples. As wives are younger on average than husbands,25 they may also
be willing to leave the workforce at an earlier age to coordinate the passage
into retirement with their spouse. The second reason for the higher exit rate
of married women is that the latter are “hedged” by their husbands’ income
and may thus have lower ﬁnancial needs than other women. In other words,
marital status has a strong inﬂuence on a woman’s economic security after
retirement. Not surprisingly, never-married women who are more likely to
have enjoyed continuous careers tend to be the most ﬁnancially prepared for
retirement. In general, widows are well cared for by the Swiss social security
system. Nonetheless there are some gaps in coverage, notably for widows of
self-employed men. The fact that the employment rate of widows is some-
25The age diﬀerence in Switzerland is approximately 3 years on average. This number
is likely to understate the true age diﬀerence of a couple at retirement, as most second
marriages display a larger age diﬀerence (the divorce rate in Switzerland is approximately
40%).
20what higher than for married women indicates that some of these women
might be ﬁnancially constrained. That widowed women stay in the labor
market longer than married women is thus not surprising. Our ﬁndings also
demonstrate that divorced women have a signiﬁcantly lower retirement haz-
ard even if one controls for income. Most of these women have suﬀered from
a previous divorce law that was strongly biased in favor of the main (male)
bread winner with respect to the allocation of retirement means accumulated
during marriage.
Lifetime income
We now turn to the main variable: the proxy for lifetime income “ln(annuity)”.
The variable is signiﬁcant (most of the times highly signiﬁcant) in all esti-
mations except one company regression. As the corresponding hazard ratio
is greater than one, a higher lifetime income induces earlier retirement. Well
paid women retire earlier than women with low labor incomes, even if one
controls for marital status. This means that the attractiveness of the job
does not seem to play a role, but rather the fact that a high pre- and after
retirement income makes an earlier retirement age aﬀordable. Table 6 shows
the analysis by quartile of “ln(annuity)”. The hazard ratio is increasing from
quartile 1 up to quartile 4 which conﬁrms the linearity of the eﬀect.
insert Tables 4 to 8, and Figures 5 & 6 here
4.2.2 Results for men
The corresponding results for men are summarized in Tables 9 to 13. The
structure and ordering of the tables correspond to those of women: Table 9
includes retirement year dummies, Table 10 cohort dummies. Table 11 looks
at dummy variables for the diﬀerent quartiles of “ln(annuity)”. Tables 12
and 13 report the same sensitivity tests as for women: by company and per
year respectively. The estimation results of the sensitivity tests again do
not diﬀer greatly from the overall regressions (except the somewhat lower
signiﬁcance levels).
As it was the case for women, including a time trend for the “ln(annuity)”
variables and/or censoring does not alter the results in a qualitative way. We
are again not able to identify the optimal model and we keep and report all
results.
The overall results for men are the following:
21Retirement year
The impact of the retirement year is exactly the same as for women: Retire-
ment year dummies, cohort dummies and the retirement year trend (variable
not reported) are highly signiﬁcant and show the dramatic increase in the
incidence of early retirement durinng the last 15 years. As reported in Fig-
ure 5, this trend is not monotonic. This is mainly driven by large ﬂuctuations
in exit rates accross the participating pension funds (see company ﬁxed ef-
fects below). The reasons for the latter are not entirely clear. It could well
be that market conditions lead ﬁrms to advertise early retirement options
more clearly, although the retirement decisions were not oﬃcially declared
as down-sizing measures. But even if some of these ﬂuctuations might have
been driven by such measures, the quantitative impact of the increase in
early retirement is strong and striking.
Marital status
However, the role of the marital status is completely diﬀerent. Married,
widowed and divorced men tend to retire later than single men. There are no
obvious (statistically signiﬁcant) diﬀerences in retirement behavior between
the former three groups when controlling for income. For men (and unlike
women), the decisive factor in the retirement behavior seems to be the pres-
ence or absence of family ties.26 There are several potential explanations for
this ﬁnding paralleling the reasoning for women. The ﬁrst is that a later
labor market exit of married men is the result of a joint retirement decision.
The second may be ﬁnancial considerations. The overwhelming majority of
today’s elderly couples have followed a traditional role model in which the
husband is the main (or even the only) bread-winner who has to care not only
for himself, but also for his wife and children (who may still be at school).
A third potential explanation is that there are large mortality diﬀerences be-
tween married and non-married men in favor of the former. If reductions to
beneﬁts for early retirement are actuarially fair, it is simply not optimal for
married men to retire before the statutory age. This eﬀect is reinforced by
the joint annuity model in Switzerland (early retirement would entail that
future beneﬁts for the surviving wife are reduced at the same rate).
26The importance of family ties (particularly for men) seems to be important for another
retirement decisions, the choice between an annuity and a lump sum upon retirement (see
B¨ utler and Teppa (2004)). The absence of family ties induces men to opt the annuity
option, probably because the annuity is the only form of insurance available to these men.
22Lifetime income
Retirement income has a clear, slightly non-monotonic impact on the re-
tirement age. Up to a very high income level, a higher annuity (and thus
a higher average lifetime income) leads to an earlier retirement, although
lower life-expectancy for lower income workers should lead to the opposite
outcome. For men, this aﬀordability eﬀect is much stronger at lower incomes
than for women. It is important to stress that a median retirement income
from the second pillar is clearly above the median income of all retirees,
as low-income earners are not covered by the second pillar. The estimated
peaks in the hazard ratio are at a second pillar income of 64’000 (56’500)
Sfr for regressions without time trend (with time trend) and no censoring
(≈ 41’200 (36’400) EU or 53’300 (47’000) $), and 183’100 (165’700) Sfr for
estimations with censoring (≈ 117’900 (106’700) EU or 152’300 (137’800) $).
This corresponds to a yearly pre-retirement income of at least 120’000 SFR
(≈ 80’000 EU or 100’000 $). The dependency of the hazard ratio on income
is also depicted in Figure 6 for the diﬀerent regressions of Table 9. Table 11
assesses the non-linearity of the annuity variable by including quartile dum-
mies instead. The results show that the hazard rate increases from quartile
1 to 3, but the hazard ratio of quartile 4 is again smaller and between the
one of quartile 2 and 3.
Aﬀordability thus seems to be a key determinant of male retirement be-
havior. There is a tendency to retire as soon as the ﬁnancial situation permits
(and as soon as early retirement plans are available). Another explanation
may be that men have usually worked all their lives, in contrast to many
women who had worked only part of their lives. Men may also suﬀer from
worse health and thus retire as soon as the ﬁnancial situation permits. Very
rich individuals again retire somewhat later possibly due to the attractiveness
of the job.
insert Tables 9 to 13 here
Company ﬁxed eﬀects
One particularly interesting feature of company level estimations (Tables 7
and 12) is that they convey large ﬂuctuations in the exit rate over the years
(see Figure 5). The incidence of early retirement is higher when retirement
schemes become more ﬂexible, and lower in years following such changes. In
most cases, however, no cause for a big ﬂuctuation could be identiﬁed. It
23could well be that due to ﬁnancial diﬃculty of a ﬁrm or higher returns on in-
vested pension capital, more people were induced to take up early retirement,
although this was not publicly admitted.
Other variables
There are, of course, many other determinants for which an impact on
the retirement decision can be anticipated, like health status, mortality dif-
ferences or the number of dependent children at retirement. A bad health
status is likely to induce early retirement regardless of the amount of annuity
the person could get.27 Mortality diﬀerences may have an impact on both
the timing of retirement and the choice of the payout option. As diﬀerences
in mortality are usually private knowledge,28 the best we can do is to include
proxies like life-time income (the rich live longer than the poor), and marital
status (married men live longer than singles). The impact of having depen-
dent children on the retirement decision is unclear, a priori. People may want
to keep on working to be able to ﬁnance their children’s expenses. But they
also might want to beneﬁt from the generous additional beneﬁts for children
(even if reduced due to early retirement) as long as they are still eligible.
The overall eﬀect will depend on the ﬁnancial situation of a family as well as
the age of the children. Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to control
for any of these variables directly.29 We cannot control for post-retirement
employment either.
5 Conclusions
Reversing early retirement trends has become a major policy issue in most
European countries. It is clear that incentives set by the social security
system will be key in this exercise. But there might be other determinants
of early retirement that are equally important. If the preference for leisure
27Through the fact that health is usually negatively correlated with (lifetime) income, it
is not completely absent from our analysis. It may be the case that less healthy individuals
might prefer to retire early, but cannot aﬀord to do so. It is hoped that more complete
data sets may help to clarify this issue in the future.
28Even if diﬀerences in mortality were observable, they would most likely not be eligible
as criteria for lower or higher pension beneﬁts.
29We have run the regressions with a small subsample of individuals in companies that
reported the number and age of children. The results are inconclusive due to the small
number of individuals with children.
24in old age is suﬃciently strong, for example, even negative implicit tax rates
on staying in the labor force might not induce people to work much longer if
they have suﬃcient funds to live on when old. This paper has aimed to shed
some light on determinants of the retirement decision other than the impact
of social security incentives by analyzing individual data from a selection of
Swiss pension funds.
The main ﬁndings from our exercise can be summarized as follows. Firstly,
there is an increasing tendency to retire early in Switzerland even in the ab-
sence of legislative changes. The eﬀect is more pronounced for men than
for women, and was found to be especially strong in the last few years. Sec-
ondly, aﬀordability seems to be a key determinant for the retirement decision,
in particular for men. Richer men (as measured by life-time labor income)
retire earlier than poorer men. For women, the eﬀect of income on the like-
lihood to exit the labor force is also positive, but weaker than for men. This
aﬀordability interpretation may also partially explain the increase in early
retirement over the last 15 years, as Switzerland’s second pillar has matured
over this period, leading to higher eﬀective replacement rates. The eﬀective
net replacement rates in Switzerland are so high now that the after retire-
ment income is close to, or even higher than average pre-retirement income.
If people are credit constraint or reluctant to oﬀset this over-saving by accu-
mulating debt, the rational response might be an earlier exit from the labor
market. Thirdly, marital status plays an important role in an individual’s
retirement decision. For men, the main diﬀerence is between singles, who
retire earlier on average, and non-singles. This hints at the importance of
family ties (and of potential ﬁnancial liabilities for children and (ex-)wives)
for men. Married women tend to retire earlier than other women, while di-
vorced and separated women clearly work longer, probably due to ﬁnancial
constraints.
We believe that our ﬁndings have important policy implications. High
replacement rates may not only have strong eﬀect on low income workers,
but also on high income workers even when explicit early retirement incen-
tives are unimportant. If pension reforms aim at an increase of the funded
part, and thus at a strengthening of the link between life-time earnings and
future pensions, reducing early retirement incentives for low income earners
may come at the cost of a higher labor market exit rate for high income
individuals, especially if eﬀective replacement rates are high.
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29Sex Marital Ret.-age r = .04 r = .04
g = 0 g = .01
male non–married 65 0.73 0.79
male married (-3) 65 1.01 1.11
female non–married 65 0.95 1.04
female married (no) 65 0.98 1.08
female married (+3) 65 1.02 1.13
male non–married 62 0.80 0.87
male married (-3) 62 1.08 1.20
female non–married 62 1.02 1.14
female married (no) 62 1.05 1.17
female married (+3) 62 1.10 1.23
Table 1: Money’s worth ratios of the Swiss second pillar system as a function
of sex, marital status, the growth rates of beneﬁts (g) and the retirement
age at which the full beneﬁt level can be claimed. For married individuals
the number in brackets is the assumed age diﬀerence to the spouse. The
discounting interest rate r is the technical interest rate used by the pension
funds. g approximately corresponds to the average Swiss inﬂation rate (to
which most beneﬁts are adjusted) since 1995.
30Before retirement
Gross income 50 100 200
Marital status sing marr m+2 sing marr m+2 sing marr m+2
Net income 41 42 44 73 77 80 135 143 147
After retirement
I = First pillar 20 30 36 25 38 46 25 38 46
II = Second pillar 12 12 17 37 37 52 87 87 122
Net (I + II - tax) 30 40 52 55 68 89 92 106 139
Replacement rates
Gross 0.65 0.85 1.07 0.63 0.75 0.98 0.56 0.63 0.84
Net 0.75 0.95 1.18 0.75 0.88 1.11 0.71 0.78 0.98
Table 2: Pension beneﬁts as a function of pre-retirement income (in 1000
Swiss Francs) and marital status (sing = single, marr = married with adult
children, m+2 = married with two children under 18/25). The computations
are based on the following (very realistic) assumptions: The spouse does not
have any second pillar income, but qualiﬁes for the same ﬁrst pillar pension
as the main bread winner (mainly through child care credits and part-time
income) in the married with adult children case. For the married with two
minor children case, it is assumed that the spouse (for obvious reasons the
wife) is too young to claim her own beneﬁts. The pension fund replaces
50% of coordinated income (= income - 25’300) with no upper income limit.
Children beneﬁts are 40% (ﬁrst pillar) and 20% (second pillar) of the main
claimant’s beneﬁts each. The tax base is the city of Z¨ urich.
31Variable Obs. in % Median Mean (Std.)
Age at retirement 8452 62.0 61.82 (2.70)
female 3084 36.5 62.0 60.90 (2.58)
single 500 16.2 61.1 60.66
married 1621 52.6 61.1 60.66
widowed 279 9.1 62.0 61.39
divorced / separated 684 22.2 62.0 61.42
Age at retirement male 5368 63.5 62.1 62.35 (2.62)
single 293 5.5 62.2 61.55
married 4587 85.4 62.0 62.40
widowed 161 3.0 63.0 62.84
divorced / separated 327 6.1 62.0 62.08
Statutory retir. age 2665 31.5
(female) 1013 32.9
(male) 1652 30.8
Annuity deﬂated 8452 35’422 41’016 (32789)
female 3084 21’730 28’315 (23378)
single 500 40’783 41’649
married 1621 17’610 26’155
widowed 279 14’246 21’650
divorced / separated 684 21’498 26’404
Annuity deﬂated male 5368 41’191 48’313 (35115)
single 293 35’126 38’356
married 4587 42’594 49’613
widowed 161 33’077 43’001
divorced / separated 327 35’518 41’613
Non–standard option 576 6.8%
(female) 149 4.8%
(male) 427 8.0%
Lump–sum capital (in %) 649 7.7% 50.3% 60.0% (36.7%)
(female) 179 5.8% 100.0% 78.0% (29.7%)
(male) 470 8.8% 44.6% 53.2% (36.8%)
Table 3: Summary statistics for some relevant variables
32I(f) II(f) III(f) IV(f)
Covariate Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio
(p–value) (p–value) (p–value) (p–value)
married 1.1783 1.1640 1.2316 1.2162
(0.007) (0.013) (0.006) (0.010)
widowed 0.9957 0.9835 0.9781 0.9650
(0.952) (0.815) (0.815) (0.707)
divorced/separated 0.9183 0.9092 0.8807 0.8713
(0.153) (0.111) (0.090) (0.067)
ln(annuity) 1.1521 1.0020 1.2780 1.0040
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ret. year dummies YES YES YES YES
(**) (**) (***) (***)
Time trend NO YES NO YES
Censoring NO NO YES YES
Comp. ﬁxed eﬀects YES YES YES YES
log p-lik. -21865.91 -21871.70 -14562.78 -14569.80
observations 3084 3084 3084 3084
failures 3084 3084 2071 2071
Table 4: Cox proportional hazard regression for women. The variable
”ln(annuity)” has been interacted with a linear time trend (if time trend
= YES). Data censored for age at retirement 61.75-62.25 (if censoring =
YES).
33I(f) II(f) III(f) IV(f)
Covariate Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio
(p–value) (p–value) (p–value) (p–value)
married 1.0523 1.0415 1.1033 1.0915
(0.367) (0.472) (0.135) (0.183)
widowed 0.9917 0.9814 1.0128 1.0014
(0.911) (0.801) (0.894) (0.988)
divorced/separated 0.8558 0.8486 0.8532 0.8454
(0.009) (0.006) (0.026) (0.019)
ln(annuity) 1.0967 1.0013 1.1943 1.0027
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
cohort dummies YES YES YES YES
(***) (***) (***) (***)
Time trend NO YES NO YES
Censoring NO NO YES YES
Comp. ﬁxed eﬀects YES YES YES YES
log p-lik. -21130.15 -21133.03 -13753.88 -13757.66
observations 3084 3084 3084 3084
failures 3084 3084 2071 2071
Table 5: Cox proportional hazard regression for women. The variable
”ln(annuity)” has been interacted with a linear time trend (if time trend
= YES). Data censored for age at retirement 61.75-62.25 (if censoring =
YES).
34IV(f; q1) IV(f; q2) IV(f; q3) IV(f; q4)
Covariate Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio
(p–value) (p–value) (p–value) (p–value)
married 1.2230 1.2230 1.2230 1.2230
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
widowed 0.9815 0.9815 0.9815 0.9815
(0.845) (0.845) (0.845) (0.845)
divorced/separated 0.9030 0.9030 0.9030 0.9030
(0.180) (0.180) (0.180) (0.180)
dummy quartile 1 — 0.9260 0.7819 0.5139
(0.215) (0.000) (0.000)
dummy quartile 2 1.0799 — 0.8444 0.5549
(0.215) (0.003) (0.000)
dummy quartile 3 1.2789 1.1843 — 0.6572
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
dummy quartile 4 1.9460 1.8020 1.5217 —
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ret. year dummies YES YES YES YES
(***) (***) (***) (***)
Censoring YES YES YES YES
Comp. ﬁxed eﬀects YES YES YES YES
log p-lik. -14548.73 -14548.73 -14548.73 -14548.73
observations 3084 3084 3084 3084
failures 2071 2071 2071 2071
Table 6: Cox proportional hazard regression for women - robustness tests
with dummies for the quartiles of yearly annuity. Data censored for age at
retirement 61.75-62.25 (if censoring = YES).
35IV(f; 1) IV(f; 10) IV(f; 11) IV(f; 15)
Covariate Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio
(p–value) (p–value) (p–value) (p–value)
married 5.0519 1.1398 1.5119 1.1528
(0.014) (0.146) (0.090) (0.561)
widowed 2.1158 0.9035 1.3810 1.0529
(0.343) (0.407) (0.226) (0.866)
divorced/separated 3.0222 0.8370 0.9591 0.5815
(0.105) (0.056) (0.844) (0.055)
ln(annuity) 1.0023 1.0044 0.9991 1.0949
(0.094) (0.000) (0.573) (0.015)
ln(annuity)2 — — — 0.9952
(0.020)
ret. year (dummy) YES (99–00) YES (90–02) YES (90–03) YES (90–02)
(*) (***) (**) (–)
max hazard — — — 11’300 Sfr
Time trend YES YES YES YES
Censoring YES YES YES YES
Comp. ﬁxed eﬀects YES YES YES YES
log p-lik. -529.43 -8651.00 -705.74 -484.17
observations 228 1891 192 256
failures 106 1323 163 101
Table 7: Cox proportional hazard regression for women by company. The
variables “ln(annuity)” and “ln(annuity)2” have been interacted with a linear
time trend (if time trend = YES). Data censored for age at retirement 61.75-
62.25 (if censoring = YES).
36IV(f; 2000) IV(f; 2001) IV(f; 2002)
Covariate Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio
(p–value) (p–value) (p–value)
married 1.1188 1.0671 0.8671
(0.576) (0.679) (0.321)
widowed 0.7040 0.8041 0.6307
(0.238) (0.374) (0.020)
divorced/separated 0.6109 0.7361 0.7458
(0.021) (0.079) (0.059)
ln(annuity) 1.0053 1.0018 1.0015
(0.000) (0.078) (0.085)
Time trend YES YES YES
Censoring YES YES YES
Comp. ﬁxed eﬀects YES YES YES
log p-lik. -1344.13 -1826.48 -2083.07
observations 409 422 441
failures 258 354 403
Table 8: Cox proportional hazard regression for women by retirement year.
The variable “ln(annuity)” has been interacted with a linear time trend (if
time trend = YES). Data censored for age at retirement 64.75-65.25 (if cen-
soring = YES).
37I(m) II(m) III(m) IV(m)
Covariate Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio
(p–value) (p–value) (p–value) (p–value)
married 0.7696 0.7726 0.6789 0.6909
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
widowed 0.7194 0.7205 0.6595 0.6598
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
divorced/separated 0.8453 0.8458 0.8211 0.8211
(0.043) (0.043) (0.052) (0.052)
ln(annuity) 3.9188 1.0224 5.3140 1.0276
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(annuity)2 0.9402 0.9989 0.9334 0.9988
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.004)
ret. year dummies YES YES YES YES
(***) (***) (***) (***)
max hazard 64’000 Sfr 56’500 Sfr 183’000 Sfr 165’600 Sfr
Time trend NO YES NO YES
Censoring NO NO YES YES
Comp. ﬁxed eﬀects YES YES YES YES
log p-lik. -41202.07 -41205.21 -29262.02 -29266.27
observations 5368 5368 5368 5368
failures 5368 5368 3716 3716
Table 9: Cox proportional hazard regression for men. The variables
“ln(annuity)” and “ln(annuity)2” have been interacted with a linear time
trend (if time trend = YES). Data censored for age at retirement 64.75-65.25
(if censoring = YES).
38I(m) II(m) III(m) IV(m)
Covariate Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio
(p–value) (p–value) (p–value) (p–value)
married 0.8023 0.8048 0.7163 0.7178
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
widowed 0.7680 0.7685 0.7181 0.7176
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013)
divorced/separated 0.8495 0.8496 0.8294 0.8288
(0.044) (0.044) (0.072) (0.070)
ln(annuity) 2.3161 1.0142 1.2397 1.0034
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(annuity)2 0.9630 0.9994 — —
(0.002) (0.001)
cohort dummies YES YES YES YES
(***) (***) (***) (***)
max hazard 69’500 Sfr 57’000 Sfr — —
Time trend NO YES NO YES
Censoring NO NO YES YES
Comp. ﬁxed eﬀects YES YES YES YES
log p-lik. -39862.94 -39864.37 -27944.22 -27947.11
observations 5368 5368 5368 5368
failures 5368 5368 3716 3716
Table 10: Cox proportional hazard regression for men. The variables
“ln(annuity)”, “ln(annuity)2” have been interacted with a linear time trend
(if time trend = YES). Data censored for age at retirement 64.75-65.25 (if
censoring = YES).
39IV(m; q1) IV(m; q2) IV(m; q3) IV(m; q4)
Covariate Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio
(p–value) (p–value) (p–value) (p–value)
married 0.6555 0.6555 0.6555 0.6555
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
widowed 0.6463 0.6463 0.6463 0.6463
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
divorced/separated 0.8041 0.8041 0.8041 0.8041
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
dummy quartile 1 — 0.6171 0.5139 0.5271
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
dummy quartile 2 1.6205 — 0.8328 0.8541
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
dummy quartile 3 1.9459 1.2008 — 1.0256
(0.000) (0.000) (0.620)
dummy quartile 4 1.8975 1.1709 0.9751 —
(0.000) (0.002) (0.620)
ret. year dummies YES YES YES YES
(***) (***) (***) (***)
Censoring YES YES YES YES
Comp. ﬁxed eﬀects YES YES YES YES
log p-lik. -29225.52 -29225.52 -29225.52 -29225.52
observations 5368 5368 5368 5368
failures 3716 3716 3716 3716
Table 11: Cox proportional hazard regression for men - robustness tests with
dummies for the quartiles of yearly annuity. Data censored for age at retire-
ment 64.75-65.25 (if censoring = YES).
40IV(m; 2) IV(m; 9) IV(m; 10) IV(m; 15)
Covariate Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio
(p–value) (p–value) (p–value) (p–value)
married 0.5181 0.7148 0.7378 0.6110
(0.000) (0.051) (0.023) (0.003)
widowed 0.6559 0.9270 0.6825 0.6696
(0.167) (0.779) (0.099) (0.092)
divorced/separated 0.6828 0.9969 0.8830 0.6798
(0.186) (0.990) (0.467) (0.076)
ln(annuity) 1.1403 1.0025 1.0801 1.0056
(0.000) (0.054) (0.001) (0.000)
ln(annuity)2 0.9942 — 0.9965 —
(0.001) (0.002)
ret. year (dummy) YES (00–03) YES (00–02) YES (90–02) YES (90–03)
(*) (*) (**) (**)
max hazard 77’800 Sfr — 62’200 Sfr —
Time trend YES YES YES YES
Censoring YES YES YES YES
Comp. ﬁxed eﬀects YES YES YES YES
log p-lik. -4054.92 -2926.48 -9305.11 -2893.79
observations 762 600 2135 937
failures 695 489 1313 460
Table 12: Cox proportional hazard regression for men by company (4 largest
companies). The variables “ln(annuity)” and “ln(annuity)2” have been in-
teracted with a linear time trend (if time trend = YES). Data censored for
age at retirement 64.75-65.25 (if censoring = YES).
41IV(m; 2000) IV(m; 2001) IV(m; 2002)
Covariate Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio
(p–value) (p–value) (p–value)
married 0.7660 0.6018 0.7990
(0.179) (0.001) (0.171)
widowed 1.0173 1.0991 0.7711
(0.954) (0.752) (0.344)
divorced/separated 0.8804 0.6168 0.9953
(0.661) (0.037) (0.983)
ln(annuity) 1.0731 1.0036 1.0036
(0.022) (0.001) (0.000)
ln(annuity)2 0.9969 — —
(0.033)
max hazard 72’800 Sfr — —
Time trend YES YES YES
Censoring YES YES YES
Comp. ﬁxed eﬀects YES YES YES
log p-lik. -4030.24 -4717.64 -3562.61
observations 884 919 749
failures 663 776 598
Table 13: Cox proportional hazard regression for men by retirement year.
The variables “ln(annuity)” and “ln(annuity)2” have been interacted with a
linear time trend (if time trend = YES). Data censored for age at retirement
64.75-65.25 (if censoring = YES).
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Figure 2: Kaplan-Meier estimator without censoring by period for women
(upper panel) and men (lower panel). The numbers on the horizontal axis
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Figure 3: Kaplan-Meier estimator without censoring for the period 2000-
2003 by marital status for women (upper panel) and men (lower panel). The





















0 5 10 15
age at retirement
1st quartile 2nd quartile
3rd quartile 4th quartile






















0 5 10 15
age at retirement
1st quartile 2nd quartile
3rd quartile 4th quartile
men, by ln(annuity) quartile
Kaplan−Meier survival estimates
Figure 4: Kaplan-Meier estimator without censoring for the period 2000-2003
by income quartiles for women (upper panel) and men (lower panel). The



































Figure 5: Relative hazard rates for year of retirement (base year 2003). The




































Figure 6: Relative hazard rates for estimations II(m) (= dashed line) and
IV(m) (= solid line) (with time trend) as a function of yearly deﬂated annuity
(base = annuity of 1 SFR). ’Qx’ denotes the xth quantile of the annuity
distribution for men.
48